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How CAN INFRINGEMENTS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES BE JUSTIFIED?
Kent McNeil
On August 21, 1996, the Supreme Court of
Canada handed down three decisions on Aboriginal
fishing rights in British Columbia: R. v. Van der Peet,'
R. v. N. T.C. Smokehouse,2 and R. v. Gladstone.' These
decisions, already known as the Van der Peet trilogy,
were followed by a decision on Aboriginal self-
government in relation to high-stakes gambling in
Ontario, R. v. Pamajewon,4 released the next day. Then
on October 3, 1996, the Court handed down two more
decisions, this time involving Aboriginal fishing rights
in Quebec: R. v. Adams5 and R. v. Cotd. 6 All these
decisions deal with section 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982," and the nature of the Aboriginal rights
which that section recognizes and affirms. Together,
these six decisions are probably the most important
pronouncements on Aboriginal rights the Supreme
Court has made so far. They are going to have a
profound impact on the Aboriginal peoples, and will
influence not only future judicial decisions but
negotiations for the resolution of Aboriginal claims as
well.
While these decisions raise a variety of vital issues
in relation to Aboriginal rights and section 35(1), my
commentary will focus on the test the Supreme Court
used for justification of federal legislative infringements
of these rights. The Supreme Court created that test in
R. v. Sparrow,' and it has now been elaborated in
Gladstone, in particular.
I S.C.C. No. 23803, [1996] S.CJ. No. 77.
2 S.C.C. No. 23800, [1996] S.C.J. No. 78.
3 S.C.C. No. 23801, [1996] S.CJ. No. 79.
4 S.C.C. No. 24596, [1996] S.CJ. No. 20.
S.C.C. No. 23615, [1996] S.C.J. No. 87.
S.C.C. No. 23707, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93.
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
Section 35(1) provides: 'The existing aboriginal and treaty
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby
recognized and affirmed."
B [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
The Sparrow test for justification places a two-
part burden of proof on the Crown. Once an
infringement of an existing Aboriginal right has been
shown, the Crown has to prove, first, that there was a
"valid legislative objective" for the infringement 9 The
Court explained:'0
An objective aimed at preserving section
35(1) rights by conserving and managing a
natural resource, for example, would be
valid. Also valid would be objectives
purporting to prevent the exercise of section
35(1) rights that would cause harm to the
general populace or to aboriginal peoples
themselves, or other objectives found to be
compelling and substantial.
The Court decided that conservation and management
of fish stocks were sufficiently compelling and
substantial legislative objectives to justify infringement
of constitutionally-protected Aboriginal fishing rights
if that was necessary to preserve the resource.
Infringement of those rights could not, however, be
justified on the basis of the "public interest." The Court
found "the 'public interest' justification to be so vague
as to provide no meaningful guidance and so broad as
to be unworkable as a test for the justification of a
limitation on constitutional rights."" Nor would it be
sufficient for the Crown to prove that its objective was
"reasonable." According to the Court, "the fact that the
objective is of a 'reasonable' nature cannot suffice as
Ibid. at 1113.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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constitutional recognition and affirmation of aboriginal
rights."'"
If the Crown is able to point to a valid legislative
objective, the analysis moves to the second part of the
justification test which requires the Crown to prove that
the measures taken to meet that objective are consistent
with its fiduciary duty towards the Aboriginal peoples.
In the Court's words, the "special trust relationship and
the responsibility of the government vis-A-vis
aboriginals must be the first consideration in
determining whether the legislation or action in
question can be justified."'3 Fulfillment of the fiduciary
duty in this context requires that certain considerations
be taken into account. Specifically, the Court said that
"[tihese include the questions of whether there has been
as little infringement as possible in order to effect the
desired result; whether, in a situation of expropriation,
fair compensation is available; and, whether the
aboriginal group in question has been consulted with
respect to the conservation measures being
implemented."' 4 More concretely, where utilization of
a resource must be limited to meet the valid objective of
conservation, the impact of the conservation measures
must limit non-Aboriginal use of the resource first. The
reason for this is that Aboriginal rights to the resource
are constitutionally protected, and therefore must be
given priority over the rights of other users which are
not constitutionally protected. The Court put it this
way:
15
The constitutional nature of the Musqueam
food fishing rights means that any allocation
of priorities after valid conservation
measures have been implemented must give
top priority to Indian food fishing.... If, in a
given year, conservation needs required a
reduction in the number of fish to be caught
such that the number equalled the number
required for food by the Indians, then all the
fish available after conservation would go to
the Indians according to the constitutional
nature of their fishing right. If, more
realistically, there were still fish left after the
12 Ibid. at 1118. Compare R.v. Badger (1996), 195 N.R. I
(S.C.C.) esp. 38; R. v. Nikal (1996), 196 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.),
at 61-7.
13 R. v. Sparrow, supra note 8 at 1114. As an aside, I have
never understood how the Crown can justify its own
infringements of the fights of the Aboriginal peoples when,
as a fiduciary, it is duty-bound to uphold and protect those
rights. For me, this is a central contradiction of the whole
justification test.
14 Ibid. at 1119.is Ibid. at 1116:
Indian food requirements were met, then the
brunt of conservation measures would be
borne by the practices of sport fishing and
commercial fishing.
The reason the priority was limited to the Musqueam
food fishery was that the Aboriginal right relied on in
Sparrow was limited to a right to fish for food, which
was taken to include fishing for social and ceremonial
purposes. For the Crown's fiduciary duty to be met in
a way that respects the constitutional recognition and
affirmation of this right, the food fishery had to be
given top priority. Any limitation, even for the valid
legislative objective of conservation, that did not give
the right priority could not be justified, and therefore
would be unconstitutional.
The issue of justification arose in the Gladstone
decision. In Gladstone the appellants, who are members
of the Heiltsuk Band in British Columbia, were able to
prove to the satisfaction of the majority of the Court
that they have an existi ng Aboriginal right to sell
herring spawn on kelp commercially, and that the right
had been infringed by federal fishery regulations made
pursuant to the Fisheries Act."6 The next question for
the majority was whether the infringement could be
justified on the basis of the Sparrow test for
justification. On this question, the majority took an
approach that, in my view, is significantly different
from the approach taken in Sparrow.
As we have seen, the first part of the justification
test requires proof by the Crown of a valid legislative
objective. While the validity of the legislative objective
of conservation was described by the Court in Sparrow
as "uncontroversial,"' the regulations being challenged
in Gladstone went beyond conservation. The regulatory
scheme involved initial determinations of how much
herring stock could be harvested in a given year and
how that stock was to be allocated to the different
herring fisheries (of which herring spawn on kelp was
one), but it also involved allocation of the resource
among various user groups. As allocation among the
user groups has little or nothing to do with
conservation, Chief Justice Lamer, in his majority
judgment, found it necessary "to consider what, if any,
16 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, now R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14. Note that
La Forest J. dissented on the issues of the nature of the
Aboriginal right and whether it had been extinguished.
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. took a different position from the
majority on the test for establishing an Aboriginal right,
and McLachlin J. took a different position on the
infringement issue.
17 R. v. Sparrow, supra note 8 at 1113.
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objectives the government may pursue, other than
conservation, which will be sufficient to satisfy the first
branch of the Sparrow justification standard."'"
Ultimately, Lamer C.J. was unable to determine
whether the objectives behind the allocation were valid
because no evidence regarding objectives had been led,
so the case was sent back to trial to resolve that issue.
He did, nonetheless, make some general observations
on what kind of objectives might meet the test.
Chief Justice Lamer affirmed the Sparrow
requirement that the objectives would have to be
"compelling and substantial."'9 He went on to say that
the purposes underlying the recognition and affirmation
of Aboriginal rights in section 35(1) "must inform not
only the definition of the rights but also the
identification of those limits on the rights which are
justifiable."' Those purposes were stated by Lamer C.J.
in the Van der Peet decision as:2'
... first, the means by which the constitution
recognizes the fact that prior to the arrival of
Europeans in North America the land was
already occupied by distinctive aboriginal
societies, and as, second, the means by
which that prior occupation is reconciled
with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over
Canadian territory.
Applying this statement of the purposes of section 35(1)
in Gladstone, Lamer C.J. said that:22
... the import of these purposes is that the
objectives which can be said to be
compelling and substantive will be those
directed at either the recognition of the prior
occupation of North America by aboriginal
peoples or - and at the level of justification
it is this purpose which may well be most
relevant - at the reconciliation of
aboriginal prior occupation with the
assertion of sovereignty by the Crown.
One may wonder how any law infringing
Aboriginal rights could ever have as its purpose "the
recognition of the prior occupation of North America
by aboriginal peoples." Leaving that apparent
contradiction aside we will focus, as did Lamer C.J., on
I,• R. v. Gladstone, supra note 3 at para. 69.
19 Ibid. at para. 70.
2 Ibid. at para. 71.
21 Ibid. at para. 72, quoting from R. v. Van der Peet, supra
note I at para. 43.
22 R. v. Gladstone, supra note 3 at para. 72.
objectives aimed at reconciling that occupation with the
Crown's sovereignty. In this context, he said:'
Because ... distinctive aboriginal societies
exist within, and are a part of, a broader
social, political and economic community,
over which the Crown is sovereign, there are
circumstances in which, in order to pursue
objectives of compelling and substantial
importance to that community as a whole
(taking into account the fact that aboriginal
societies are a part of that community), some
limitation of those rights will be justifiable.
Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the
reconciliation of aboriginal societies with
the broader political community of which
they are part; limits placed on those rights
are, where the objectives furthered by those
limits are of sufficient importance to the
broader community as a whole, equally a
necessary part of that reconciliation.
While it is clear from the Sparrow decision that
Aboriginal rights are not absolute, the examples the
Court gave there of compelling and substantial
objectives which justify infringement of those rights
involved objectives that either maintain the rights by
conserving the resources on which the rights depend or
ensure that the rights are not exercised in a dangerous
way. Other compelling and substantial objectives might
involve balancing the constitutional rights of the
Aboriginal peoples against the constitutional rights of
non-Aboriginal Canadians in circumstances of potential
conflict. But Lamer C.J. went much further than that in
Gladstone. For him, it appears that objectives of
sufficient importance to Canadians generally can be
compelling and substantial, even where no conflicting
constitutional rights are involved. This looks very much
like the "public interest" justification that the Court
rejected in Sparrow.
More specifically, in the context of the Aboriginal
fishing rights at issue in Gladstone, Lamer CJ. said
this:'
2. Ibid. at para. 73.
24 For a critical discussion of why the Court took that
position in Sparrow, see K. McNeil, "Envisaging
Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments" (1993)
19 Queen's L. 95.
25 R. v.Gladvtone, supra note 3 at para. 75. See also R. v.
Adams, supra note 5, and R. v. Coti, supra note 6, where
in each case the Crown failed to prove a valid legislative
objective.
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Although by no means making a definitive
statement on this issue, I would suggest that
with regards to the distribution of the
fisheries resource after conservation goals
have been met, objectives such as the pursuit
of economic and regional fairness, and the
recognition of the historical reliance upon,
and participation in, the fishery by non-
aboriginal groups, are the type of objectives
which can (at least in the right circum-
stances) satisfy this standard. In the right
circumstances, such objectives are in the
interest of all Canadians and, more
importantly, the reconciliation of aboriginal
societies with the rest of Canadian society
may well depend on their successful
attainment.
We need to be clear that what Lamer C.J. was referring
to here was not reconciliation through agreements
negotiated with Aboriginal peoples, but rather
reconciliation through unilaterally imposed legislative
infringements of their constitutional rights.26 This
sounds less like an approach designed to achieve real
reconciliation through mutual respect and negotiated
settlements and more like a continuation of the
historical treatment of the Aboriginal peoples, whereby,
in the words of Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. in
Sparrow, their rights "were often honoured in the
breach."" While one can appreciate that the interests of
non-Aboriginal groups in the fishery are also involved,
the fact is that if those interests are in conflict with
Aboriginal fishing rights today, then the historical
reliance upon and participation in the fishery by those
groups in the past was probably in violation of
Aboriginal rights as well. Can reconciliation really be
achieved by judicially-authorized perpetuation of past
injustices rather than sitting down and working out
mutually-acceptable solutions to these conflicts?
More broadly, in the passage quoted above Lamer
C.J. suggested that "objectives such as the pursuit of
economic and regional fairness" might, "in the right
circumstances," satisfy the "compelling and substantial"
standard laid down in Sparrow. Here Lamer C.J. was
not concerned with conservation, or public safety, or
conflicting constitutional or even legal rights - he was
referring to economic interests. But of what value are
26 The Crown's fiduciary duty requires consultation with
affected Aboriginal groups, but their agreement is not
necessary for their rights to be infringed: see Sparrow,
supra note 8, esp. the passage at 1119 quoted supra in text
accompanying note 14.
27 R. v. Sparrow, supra note 8 at 1103.
the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples if
they can be over-ridden to meet economic
considerations in the distribution of resources? Should
economic and regional fairness serve to justify
infringement of constitutional rights, especially the
rights of the Aboriginal peoples which are not subject
to section 1 of the Charter?" And how can this be fair
to Aboriginal peoples, when their lands have been taken
from them and their economies and ways of life have
been devastated by European colonization, with the
result that they are at the bottom of the scale in Canada
on virtually every economic and social indicator?
Justice McLachlin did point out some of the
problems with Lamer C.J.'s approach to the
justification issue. While she did not deal with this issue
herself in Gladstone,29 she was very critical of Lamer
C.J.'s approach in her dissenting judgment in Van der
Peet. She thought his approach was inconsistent with
earlier authorities, in particular the Sparrow decision,
because his interpretation of the Sparrow test for
justification extended the meaning of "compelling and
substantial" purpose, in her words, "to any goal which
can be justified for the good of the community as a
whole, aboriginal and non-aboriginal. '"30 After citing the
above-quoted passage from his judgment referring to
economic and regional fairness, she said this:
3'
Leaving aside the undefined limit of "proper
circumstances," the historical reliance of the
participation of non-aboriginal fishers in the
fishery seems quite different from the
compelling and substantial objectives the
Court described in Sparrow - conservation
of the resource, prevention of harm to the
population, or prevention of harm to the
aboriginal people themselves. These are
indeed compelling objectives, relating to the
fundamental conditions of the responsible
exercise of the right. As such, it may safely
be said that right-thinking persons would
agree that these limits may properly be
applied to the exercise of even
constitutionally entrenched rights.
28 Aboriginal rights are not subject to section I because the
section recognizing and affirming those rights, viz. s.35, is
outside the Charter.
2 This was because her opinion on the nature of the
Aboriginal right and whether it had been infringed or not
made it unnecessary for her to consider justification.
3 R. v. Van der Peet, supra note 1 at para. 304.
31 Ibid. at para. 305-306.
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[Tihe range of permitted limitation of an
established aboriginal right is confined [in
Sparrow] to the exercise of the right rather
than to the diminution, extinguishment or
transfer of the right to others.... The
extension of the concept of compelling
objective to matters like economic and
regional fairness and the interests of non-
aboriginal fishers, by contrast, would negate
the very aboriginal right to fish itself, on the
ground that this is required for the
reconciliation of aboriginal rights and other
interests and the consequent good of the
community as a whole. This is not limitation
required for the responsible exercise of the
right, but rather limitation on the basis of the
economic demands of non-aboriginals. It is
a limitation of a different order than the
conservation, harm prevention type of
limitation sanctioned in Sparrow.
Justice McLachlin also attacked Lamer C.J.'s use
of reconciliation as a justification for infringing
Aboriginal rights. While recognizing that reconciliation
is "a goal of fundamental importance," '32 she pointed out
that:"
It]he question is how this reconciliation of
the different legal cultures of aboriginal and
non-aboriginal peoples is to be accom-
plished. More particularly, does the goal of
reconciliation of aboriginal and non-
aboriginal interests require that we permit
the Crown to require a judicially authorized
transfer of the aboriginal right to non-
aboriginals without the consent of the
'aboriginal people, without treaty, and
without compensation? I cannot think it
does.
Justice McLachlin emphasized that the traditional
method for achieving reconciliation between Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada is through
negotiations that lead to treaties. In the case of the
Sto:lo Nation, whose rights were at issue in the Van der
Peet case, no treaty had ever been signed with them.
She remarked that "[u]ntil we have exhausted the
traditional means by which aboriginal and non-
aboriginal legal perspectives may be reconciled, it
seems difficult to assert that it is necessary for the
courts to suggest more radical methods of reconciliation
possessing the potential to erode aboriginal rights
seriously."'
Justice McLachlin also regarded Lamer C.J.'s
approach to the justification issue as "indeterminate and
ultimately more political than legal."3 We will return to
this aspect of her critique after examining Lamer CJ.'s
approach to the second part of the justification test.
As discussed above, the second part of the test
requires proof that the measures taken to meet a
legislative objective which has been shown to be valid
are consistent with the Crown's fiduciary duty to the
Aboriginal peoples. In his majority judgment in
Gladstone, Lamer C.J. watered down this branch of the
justification test as well. It will be recalled that the
Court in Sparrow decided that, where conservation
measures are necessary to preserve a resource such as
the fishery, the impact of the measures must fall on non-
Aboriginal users of the resource first. In the context of
that case, this meant that the Aboriginal right in
question, namely the right to fish for food, social and
ceremonial purposes, had to be given top priority
because it took precedence over non-Aboriginal
commercial and sport fishing.' While purporting to
maintain this requirement of priority, Lamer C.J.
decided that it could not operate in the same way in the
circumstances of the Gladstone case. The distinction he
saw was that in Sparrow the right was internally limited
by the fact that the Musqueam only needed so much fish
for food, social and ceremonial purposes, whereas the
right of the Heiltsuk to sell herring spawn commercially
in Gladstone was not subject to any internal limitation
- the only limitations in that context were external,
namely the availability of the resource and the demands
of the market. The problem Lamer C.J. found with
giving top priority to a right that has no internal
limitations was that it would make the right an exclusive
one. He put it this way:"
Because the right to sell herring spawn on
kelp to the commercial market can never be
said to be satisfied while the resource is still
available and the market is not sated, to give
priority to that right in the manner suggested
in Sparrow would be to give the right-holder
exclusivity over any person not having an
34 Ibid. at para. 313.
35 Ibid. at para. 302.
36 In R. v. Adams, supra note 5 at para. 59, the Supreme
Cor affirmed that the Aboriginal right to fish for food
"should be given first priority after conservation concerns
are met." See also R. v. Coti, supra note 6 at para. 82.
37 R. v. Gladstone, supra note 3 at para. 59.
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32 Ibid. at para. 310.
33 Ibid.
aboriginal right to participate in the herring spawn on
kelp fishery.
I fail to understand why this right would be
exclusive except in circumstances where the Heiltsuk
were capable of taking all the herring spawn on kelp
available after conservation requirements had been met.
But leaving that aside, the main problem with Lamer
C.J.'s approach is that it ignores the Sparrow rationale
for giving top priority to Aboriginal fishing rights,
namely that those rights are constitutionally protected
while the rights of non-Aboriginal users of the resource
are not. It is the constitutional status of the Aboriginal
right which determines its priority, not the nature of the
specific Aboriginal right in question. But Lamer C.J.
down-played the significance of this constitutional
status by saying that constitutionalization of Aboriginal
fishing rights, while resulting in priority for those rights,
cannot have been intended to extinguish the right of the
public generally to fish.
So what did Lamer C.J. mean.when he said that an
Aboriginal right to fish commercially has priority over
non-Aboriginal fishing, but not the kind of priority
contemplated in Sparrow? It is at this point that the
analysis becomes vague. Here is Lamer C.J.'s
explanation:3
Where the aboriginal right is one that has no
internal limitation then the doctrine of
priority does not require that, after
conservation goals have been met, the
government allocate the fishery so that those
holding an aboriginal right to exploit that
fishery on a commercial basis are given an
exclusive right to do so. Instead, the doctrine
of priority requires the government to
demonstrate that, in allocating the resource,
it has taken account of the existence of
aboriginal rights and allocated the resource
in a manner respectful of the fact that those
rights have priority over the exploitation of
the fishery by other users. This right is at
once both procedural and substantive; at the
stage of justification the government must
demonstrate both that the process by which
it allocated the resource and the actual
allocation of the resource which results from
that process reflect the prior interest of
aboriginal rights holders in the fishery.
Chief Justice Lamer admitted that the "content of this
priority - something less than exclusivity but which
nonetheless gives priority to the aboriginal right -
must remain somewhat vague pending consideration of
the government's actions in specific cases."39 He
analogized with the approach under section 1 of the
Charter, "requiring the courts to scrutinize government
action for reasonableness on a case-by-case basis."'
But we have seen that in Sparrow the Court specifically
rejected reasonableness as a standard for deciding the
validity of a legislative objective because reasonable-
ness was not a sufficient justification for infringing
constitutional rights. If the vague standard of reason-
ableness cannot justify a legislative objective, how can
it meet the second part of the justification test which
requires the government action to be consistent with the
fiduciary duty owed to the aboriginal peoples?
In her dissenting opinion in Van der Peet,
McLachlin J. was just as critical of Lamer C.J.'s
position on the second part of the justification test as
she was of his position on the first part. She began by
pointing out that:"'
[t]he duty of a fiduciary, or trustee, is to
protect and conserve the interest of the
person whose property is entrusted to him....
The Chief Justice's test, however, would
appear to permit the constitutional
aboriginal fishing right to be conveyed by
regulation, law or executive act to non-
native fishers who have historically fished in
the area in the interests of community
harmony and reconciliation of aboriginal
and non-aboriginal interests.
She also thought that his approach might "render
meaningless" the priority scheme set out in Sparrow."'
She said this:43
On his test, once conservation is satisfied, a
variety of other interests, including the
historical participation of non-native fishers,
may justify a variety of regulations govern-
ing distribution of the resource. The only
39 Ibid. at para. 63.
40 Ibid.
41 R. v. Van der Peet, supra note I at para. 307.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid. Note that McLachlin J. avoided Lamer CJ.'s
exclusivity concern by limiting the Aboriginal right in
question "to supplying what the aboriginal people
traditionally took from the fishery" (ibid. at para. 311).
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38 Ibid. at para. 62.
requirement is that the distribution scheme
'take into account' the aboriginal right.
Moreover, in her view Lamer C.J.'s approach inappro-
priately applies to section 35(1) a section 1 Charter
analysis, whereby an infringement of an individual right
"may be justified if this is in the interest of Canadian
society as a whole." While such an analysis is specifi-
cally authorized by section 1, she observed that:4
the framers of section 35(1) deliberately
chose not to subordinate the exercise of
aboriginal rights to the good of society as a
whole.... To follow the path suggested by the
Chief Justice is, with respect, to read
judicially the equivalent of section 1 into
section 35(1), contrary to the intention of the
framers of the constitution.
As mentioned above, McLachlin J. also regarded
Lamer C.J.'s approach to the justification issue as
"indeterminate and ultimately more political than
legal."' She found evidence of imprecision in the
suggestion that, " '[i]n the right circumstances', them-
selves undefined, governments may abridge aboriginal
rights on the basis of an undetermined variety of
considerations."
'47 She continued: 4
8
While "account" must be taken of the native
interest and the Crown's fiduciary
obligation, one is left uncertain as to what
degree. At the broadest reach, whatever the
government of the day deems necessary in
order to reconcile aboriginal and non-
aboriginal interests might pass muster. In
narrower incarnations, the result will depend
on doctrine yet to be determined. Upon
challenge in the courts, the focus will
predictably be on the social justifiability of
the measure rather than the rights
guaranteed.
Justice McLachlin's final salvo was levelled at
Lamer C.J.'s suggestion that, in her words, "aboriginals
may be required to share their fishing rights with non-
aboriginals in order to effect a reconciliation of
" Ibid. at para. 308.
45 Ibid. McLachlin J. was implicitly relying on the fact that
s.35(l) is outside the Charter, and therefore is not subject
to s.I.
4 Ibid. at para. 302.
7 Ibid. at para. 309.
44 Ibid.
aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests." 49 For her, this
is unconstitutional. She put it this way:"
How, without amending the constitution, can
the Crown cut down the aboriginal right?
The exercise of the rights guaranteed by
section 35(1) is subject to reasonable
limitation to ensure that they are used
responsibly. But the rights themselves can
be diminished only through treaty and
constitutional amendment. To reallocate the
benefit of the right from aboriginals to non-
aboriginals would be to diminish the
substance of the fight that section 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982 guarantees to the
aboriginal people. This no court can do.
Coming from a colleague, this is incisive criticism
of Lamer C.J.'s approach to the justification test.
Moreover, it is criticism that went largely unanswered
in his judgment in Gladstone, even though Van der Peet
was released the same day. In my view, what Lamer
C.J. has done on behalf of the majority is virtually to
abdicate the Supreme Court's responsibility for
upholding what are supposed to be the constitutional
rights of the Aboriginal peoples. On his approach, those
rights can now be overridden on broad policy grounds
relating to economic and regional fairness, and even to
support the economic interests of particular groups such
as commercial fishers whose historic use of the fishery
may well have been a violation of Aboriginal rights all
along. The extent to which the Supreme Court will
scrutinize government actions to protect Aboriginal
rights against infringement remains unclear. One can
only hope that in specific situations the Court will hold
the federal government to a high fiduciary standard
before sanctioning infringements of Aboriginal rights,
but the deferential attitude to government policy which
I detect in Gladstone is disappointing, to say the least,
and does not augur well for the future.O-
Kent McNeil
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
49 Ibid. at para. 315.
50 Ibid.
FORUM CONSTITUTIONNEL (1997) 8:2
